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Abstract This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes
and Rosenthal (Games Econ Behav 44(1):114–133, 2003a). In contrast to the existing
solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characteriza-
tion. Moreover, its best-response set has the same Hausdorff dimension as its support,
which may be seen as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links
to the literature on Blotto games.
Keywords Chopstick auction · Exposure problem · Self-similarity · Blotto games
JEL Classification C02 (Mathematical Methods) · C72 (Noncooperative Games) ·
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1 Introduction
Despite being one of the main mechanism for allocating multiple objects, simultane-
ous auctions are notorious for exposing bidders to the risk of ending up overpaying for
the combination of objects ultimately won.1 Much of the basic intuition is captured
1 See Milgrom (2000). For illustrations of such exposure risk see, e.g., van Damme (2000), Ewerhart
and Moldovanu (2005), and Ewerhart et al. (2012). Also the findings of the experimental literature are
consistent with the view that inexperienced subjects fall prey to exposure risk (Englmaier et al. 2009; Mago
and Sheremeta 2016).
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by the example of the so-called first-price chopstick auction (Szentes and Rosenthal
2003a; see also Postlewaite and Wilson 2003). In that auction, two bidders simulta-
neously place bids on three identical objects. Moreover, the value of winning at most
one object is zero, whereas the value of winning at least two objects is positive. For the
first-price chopstick auction, Szentes and Rosenthal constructed a doubly symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium, henceforth referred to as the Szentes–Rosenthal equilib-
rium (SRE), in which bidders randomize according to a uniform distribution over the
surface of a tetrahedron.
The structure of the SRE is intriguing, in particular because it features a two-
dimensional equilibrium support enclosing a three-dimensional best-response set. As
Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b) noted, however, their solution has two drawbacks.
First, the equilibrium strategy is surprisingly complicated. Second, given that the best-
response set has a higher dimension than the equilibrium support, it seems unlikely
that the SRE would be the result of a process that is aligned with some kind of better-
or best-response dynamics.
The present paper documents the existence of a new type of equilibrium for the
chopstick auction. In the sequel, this equilibrium will be referred to as the self-similar
equilibrium (SSE). To construct the SSE, we consider a variant of the chopstick auction,
using an approach due to Sion and Wolfe (1957).2 In that variant, the decision-making
process of each bidder is stretched out over infinitely many stages. Moreover, at each
stage, a choice is made between merely two alternatives for each object (hold vs.
raise). Below, we will interpret, in an admittedly generous way, the resulting multistage
game as a dynamic auction.3 The equilibrium bid distribution of the SSE will then
be characterized as the measure-theoretic image of a simple stationary strategy in the
dynamic auction, where the stationarity property in the dynamic auction translates
into a self-similarity property in the simultaneous game.
Related literature “Fractal” solutions to noncooperative games of the Blotto type
have been identified by Gross and Wagner (1950) and Kvasov (2007). However, nei-
ther of these papers considered the case of the chopstick auction.4 Gross (1954) has
constructed an example of a zero-sum game on the square with rational payoff func-
tions and the Cantor distribution as the unique equilibrium.5 Related is also the recent
paper by Topolyan (2014). She uses the binary expansion of a uniformly distributed
random bid to construct a continuum of equilibria in an all-pay team contest with
additive contributions. Ok (2004) proved a fixed-point theorem for correspondences
and applied it to rationalizability as well as to self-similar sets.
2 Although Sion and Wolfe (1957) is more commonly known for providing an example of a two-person
zero-sum game without a value, later sections of their paper describe a way to transcribe any static game
on the square into a dynamic game with unobservable actions.
3 The interpretation is generous because, just as in Sion and Wolfe (1957), actions remain private infor-
mation, so that there is no updating in the extensive-form game. Thus, also in the dynamic auction, the
interaction between the bidders ultimately remains of a one-shot nature.
4 The relationship to the literature on “fractal” solutions will be discussed more thoroughly in a separate
section at the end of the present paper, where some new conjectures are formulated as well.
5 Cf. Karlin (1959), who also cites Gross (1952).
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The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
set-up. In Sect. 3, the dynamic variant of the chopstick auction is introduced, and the
SSE constructed. A proof of the equilibrium property is provided in Sect. 4. Section 5
deals with the dimension of the best-response set. In Sect. 6, the SSE is characterized
as a self-similar probability measure. Section 7 concludes.
2 Set-up
In the chopstick auction considered by Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a), a seller offers
three identical objects, A, B, and C , via simultaneous sealed-bid auctions to a given
population of two bidders. Each of the two bidders i = 1, 2 submits a vector of bids,
Xi =
(
XiA, X
i
B , X
i
C
)
∈ R3+. (1)
For each object ν ∈ {A, B, C}, the bidder i ≡ iν ∈ {1, 2} submitting the highest bid
on object ν wins that object and pays her bid Xiν to the seller, where ties are broken
randomly, fairly, and independently across objects.6 Bidder i’s valuation of winning
a total of qi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} objects is
V (qi ) =
{
0 if qi ≤ 1
2 if qi ≥ 2, (2)
i.e., a bidder has a valuation of zero if she wins at most one object, and a valuation of two
if she wins at least two objects. This specification of bidders’ valuations corresponds to
the so-called pure chopstick case discussed in Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a, Ch. 2). In
the first-price chopstick auction, bidder i’s expected payoff equals her valuation V (qi )
less the sum of her winning bids. In the second-price chopstick auction, the bidder
winning any object ν (with ν = A, B, C) pays only the second-highest bid on that
object. Finally, in the all-pay chopstick auction, bidders pay their bids unconditionally
rather than conditionally on winning. However, the term chopstick auction, i.e., without
qualification, will be reserved for the first-price format.7
3 A variant of the chopstick auction
As outlined in the Introduction, we will now modify the set-up introduced above and
assume that each player’s decision regarding her respective bid strategy is decomposed
into infinitely many choices that are taken in a sequential manner, yet still before the
release of any information about the opponent’s strategy.
6 The results of the present paper hold, however, for any tie-breaking rule.
7 In any of these auctions, a mixed strategy μ for bidder i is understood to be a Borel probability measure
on [0, 2]3. Moreover, a mixed strategy μ is a symmetric equilibrium strategy (in the simultaneous auction)
if μ maximizes a player’s expected payoff, within the set of all mixed strategies, given that her opponent
adheres to μ.
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The formal framework is as follows. At any stage t ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, each bidder
i ∈ {1, 2} chooses, for each object ν ∈ {A, B, C} separately, whether to hold (xiν(t) =
0) or to raise her bid (xiν(t) = 1). Thus, at any t ∈ N, each bidder i ∈ {1, 2} is assumed
to select the binary vector
xi (t) =
(
xiA(t), x
i
B(t), x
i
C (t)
)
(3)
from the set Dt = {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}. Bidder i ∈ {1, 2} will be said to win object
ν ∈ {1, 2, 3} against bidder j = i if there is a stage Tν ∈ N such that xiν(t) = x jν (t)
for all t < Tν , and xiν(Tν) = 1 > 0 = x jν (Tν). If such Tν < ∞ does not exist, then
we will say that there is a tie on object ν. Thus, the allocation of the three objects is
determined either after finitely many stages at T ≡ max{TA, TB, TC } < ∞, or the
bidding develops entirely in parallel on at least one object. As discussed, however,
there is no updating, i.e., the binary vector xi (t) ∈ Dt chosen by bidder i ∈ {1, 2}
at any stage t ∈ N is assumed to remain unobservable for bidder j = i during the
entire auction. By a (reduced-form) pure strategy for bidder i ∈ {1, 2}, we mean a
sequence xi = {xi (t)}∞t=1 consisting of choices xi (t) ∈ Dt for all t ∈ N. Alternatively,
a pure strategy may be written as a vector xi = (xiA, xiB , xiC ), where xiν = {xiν(t)}∞t=1
is a binary sequence for each object ν ∈ {A, B, C}. The set of pure strategies will
be denoted by D = ∏∞t=1 Dt . Payoffs in the dynamic game are derived from the
simultaneous first-price chopstick auction, where bidder i’s bid Xiν on object ν ∈
{A, B, C} is replaced by
ρ(xiν) =
∞∑
t=1
xiν(t)
2t
∈ [0, 1]. (4)
Thus, the binary choices made by a bidder for an object in the course of the dynamic
bidding process are interpreted as digits in the binary expansion of the corresponding
bid in the simultaneous auction.8 The thereby defined infinite-horizon game will be
referred to as the dynamic (first-price) chopstick auction. Thus, intuitively, the dynamic
auction is equivalent to the original chopstick auction, except that any bid vector in
R
3+ may possess up to 23 = 8 binary representations, and that bids in the dynamic
auction cannot exceed one.
Next, we define two mixed extensions of the dynamic chopstick auction, following
essentially Kuhn (1953).9 A mixed strategy in the dynamic auction is a probability
measure on D, where the Borel sets on D are derived from the product of the discrete
topologies on each factor Dt .10 Bidder i’s expected payoff resulting from a pair of
mixed strategies is defined as usual in terms of the bilinear extension of i’s payoff
function. This extension is well-defined because payoffs are bounded. Moreover, by
the substitution rule (Kallenberg 1997, Lemma 1.22), expected payoffs in the dynamic
8 It should be noted that the mapping ρ is continuous, so that the payoff functions in the dynamic game are
Borel measurable.
9 While Kuhn’s (1953) analysis focuses on finite games, an extension to games with infinite play length
has been accomplished in unpublished work by P. Wolfe (cf. Aumann 1964).
10 Since each Dt is a separable metric space, the Borel σ -field on D corresponds precisely to the measure-
theoretic product of the Borel σ -fields on each Dt . See Kallenberg (1997, Lemma 1.2).
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auction may be determined alternatively by considering the image measures of the
players’ mixed strategies in the simultaneous auction and calculating expected payoffs
there. A (path-independent) behavior strategy ξ = {ξ(t)}∞t=1 in the dynamic auction
specifies an independent random variable with values in the finite choice set Dt at
each stage t ∈ N. By taking the product measure over the component distributions of
a given behavior strategy ξ , we obtain a unique mixed strategy in the dynamic auction,
which will be denoted as ξ˜ . In particular, expected payoffs resulting, say, from a pair of
behavior strategies are well-defined. A behavior strategy ξ is a symmetric equilibrium
strategy (in the dynamic auction) if the associated mixed strategy ξ˜ maximizes any
bidder i’s expected payoffs, within the set of all mixed strategies, under the condition
that bidder i’s opponent j = i adheres to ξ˜ .
A specific behavior strategy ξSSE in the dynamic chopstick auction is defined by the
requirement that, at each stage t ∈ N, the bidder samples her choices independently
and according to the following probability distribution:
State ω(t) ω0 ω1 ω2 ω3
Probability pr(ω(t)) 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Binary vector x(t) (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0)
(5)
Thus, adhering to ξSSE means that, at each stage, the bidder either holds her bids
on all three objects, or raises her bids on precisely two randomly selected objects.
Moreover, each of these altogether four possibilities is selected with equal probability,
and independently across stages.
The following observation is key to most of the results of the present paper.
Lemma 1 ξSSE is a symmetric equilibrium strategy in the dynamic chopstick auction.
A proof will be provided in the next section. Lemma 1 is useful because it allows
constructing a new type of equilibrium in the simultaneous chopstick auction. To see
this, start from the mixed strategy ξ˜SSE induced by the behavior strategy ξSSE. Note
next that any pure strategy x = (xA, xB, xC ) ∈ D in the dynamic chopstick auction
may be transformed, by component-wise application of the mapping ρ, into a bid
vector
X = (X A, X B , XC ) = (ρ(xA), ρ(xB), ρ(xC )) ∈ [0, 1]3 (6)
in the simultaneous auction. Since this transformation is continuous, the measure-
theoretic image of the mixed strategy ξ˜SSE under the transformation is a well-defined
mixed strategy μSSE in the simultaneous auction. Moreover, as stated in the follow-
ing proposition, the image distribution inherits from ξSSE the property of being a
symmetric equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1 μSSE is a symmetric equilibrium strategy in the simultaneous first-prize
chopstick auction.
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Proof The claim follows directly from Lemma 1. Indeed, any bid exceeding one
against μSSE is suboptimal, because Xν = 1 wins object ν with probability one. It
therefore suffices to note that the component-wise application of the mapping ρ is
surjective on [0, 1]3. unionsq
Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b, p. 293) conjectured that the SRE is unique within the
class of symmetric equilibria of the chopstick auction. Proposition 1 above shows
that this is not the case. Instead, the chopstick auction admits at least one alternative
symmetric solution, viz., the SSE. With the help of additional arguments that will be
detailed elsewhere, one can even show that any convex combination of the SSE and
the SRE is again a symmetric equilibrium. However, as will be explained in Sect. 6,
there is no easy way to construct additional equilibria in the chopstick auction using
the replacement techniques known from the literature on the Blotto game.
Similarities between SSE and SRE In the remainder of this section, it will be shown
that the SSE shares some of the remarkable properties of the SRE.
First, most obviously, the SSE is a doubly symmetric equilibrium, i.e., symmetric
both with respect to the bidders and with respect to the objects. This is true also for
the SRE.
Second, as in the case of the SRE, any bivariate marginal distribution of the SSE,
i.e., any distribution of bids on any given pair of objects, is uniform. To see this, denote
by F(X A, X B , XC ) the probability that μSSE is component-wise weakly smaller than
(X A, X B , XC ) ∈ R3+. Thus, F is the distribution function of μSSE. Then, integrating
out the last component, we obtain F(X A, X B , 1) = X A X B , as follows directly from
considering the projection of the probability distribution (5) on the first two coordi-
nates. Thus, the bivariate marginal distributions of the SSE are indeed uniform on
[0, 1]2.11
Next, the expected payoff in the SSE is zero. Indeed, by symmetry, each bidder
wins two or more objects with probability 12 , and therefore has an expected valuation
of 12 · 2 = 1. Moreover, each bidder wins any given object with probability 12 , and the
winning bid corresponds in distribution to the maximum of two independent draws
from the uniform distribution on the unit interval, so that the mean winning bid equals
2
3 , and the expected payment per bidder is 3 · 12 · 23 = 1. Thus, bidders’ rents are entirely
extracted not only in the SRE, but also in the SSE.
Finally, as in the case of the SRE, the pricing rule may be modified. For example,
when any bid realization in μSSE is multiplied with the factor two, one obtains an
equilibrium in the second-prize auction. Indeed, when bids are distributed uniformly,
the expected losing bid corresponds to one half of the winning bid (Szentes and
Rosenthal 2003a). Similarly, an equilibrium in the all-pay auction may be found by
replacing any bid realization in μSSE by its second power (Szentes 2005; Kovenock
and Roberson 2012).
11 However, in contrast to the SRE, there is no simple algebraic expression for F(X A, X B , XC ) in the
case of the SSE.
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4 Proof of Lemma 1
The idea of the proof is it to exploit the stationarity of the behavior strategy ξSSE as
much as possible.
We start by deriving an explicit expression for the bidder’s expected payoff from
playing an arbitrary pure strategy x ∈ D against the behavior strategy ξSSE in the
dynamic chopstick auction. Given two pure strategies x = {x(t)}∞t=1 ∈ D and x̂ ={̂x(t)}∞t=1 ∈ D in the dynamic chopstick auction, we shall say that x weakly wins all
the objects against x̂ , in short x ≥ x̂ , if for all three objects v = A, B, C , the bid
xν = {xν(t)}∞t=1 either wins or ties against x̂ν = {̂xν(t)}∞t=1. We may then define, for
the behavior strategy ξSSE in the dynamic chopstick auction, its “distribution function”
(x) = pr(ξSSE ≤ x). (7)
Then, noting that ties occur with probability zero, a bidder’s expected payoff from
playing the pure strategy x = (xA, xB, xC ) ∈ D against the behavior strategy ξSSE
may be expressed as
(x) = 2{(xA, xB, 1) + (xA, 1, xC ) + (1, xB , xC ) − 2(x)}
− ρ(xA)(xA, 1, 1) − ρ(xB)(1, xB , 1) − ρ(xC )(1, 1, xC ). (8)
Exploiting further the fact that all bivariate marginals of  are products of independent
uniform distributions, as discussed in the previous section, Eq. (8) may be written
alternatively as
(x) = 2ρ(xA)ρ(xB) + 2ρ(xA)ρ(xC ) + 2ρ(xB)ρ(xC )
− ρ(xA)2 − ρ(xB)2 − ρ(xC )2 − 4(x). (9)
This is the desired explicit expression for a bidder’s expected payoff resulting from a
pure-strategy deviation x ∈ D in the dynamic chopstick auction.
Next, to exploit the stationarity of the behavior strategy ξSSE, we note that any
given pure strategy x = {x(t)}∞t=1 ∈ D in the dynamic chopstick auction may be
decomposed into a first-stage choice
x(1) ∈ D1 = {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}, (10)
and a shifted pure strategy
x+ = {x+(t)}∞t=1 = {x(t + 1)}∞t=1 ∈ D. (11)
This decomposition, which can be accomplished in an analogous fashion for any bid
on an individual object, proves very useful for all that follows. For instance, one may
readily check that ρ satisfies the recursive relationship
ρ(xν) = xν(1) + ρ(x
+
ν )
2
, (12)
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for any object ν ∈ {A, B, C} and for any pure strategy x ∈ D.
Simple recursive relationships can be derived now for the function  = (x),
which will enable us to evaluate the sign of (x). The following lemma states those
relationships, where the symmetry of the behavior strategy ξSSE across objects allows
restricting attention to a subset of values for the first-stage choice x(1).
Lemma 2 For any pure strategy x ∈ D in the dynamic chopstick auction,
(x) = 1
4
·
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(x+) if x(1) = (0, 0, 0)
ρ(x+A )ρ(x
+
B ) if x(1) = (0, 0, 1)
ρ(x+A ) + (x+) if x(1) = (0, 1, 1)
1 + ρ(x+A )ρ(x+B ) + ρ(x+A )ρ(x+C ) + ρ(x+B )ρ(x+C ) if x(1) = (1, 1, 1).(13)
Proof Let x ∈ D be an arbitrary pure strategy in the dynamic chopstick auction. As
explained above, we may decompose x into a first-stage choice x(1) ∈ D1 and a
shifted pure strategy x+ ∈ D. The four cases in Eq. (13) are now dealt with one at a
time:
Case 1 Suppose first that the first-period choice prescribed by the pure strategy x is
x(1) = (0, 0, 0). Intuitively, strategy x speculates on ω(1) realizing to ω0, because
in all other cases, it becomes impossible to weakly win all three objects. Put more
formally, x weakly wins all the objects against a specific realization x̂ ∈ D of the
behavior strategy ξSSE if and only if the following two conditions hold: (i) the first-
period choice prescribed by the realized pure strategy x̂ is x̂(1) = (0, 0, 0), and (ii)
the shifted strategy x+ weakly wins all objects against the shifted realization
x̂+ = {̂x+(t)}∞t=1 = {̂x(t + 1)}∞t=1 ∈ D. (14)
But, by definition, the behavior strategy ξSSE is stationary, i.e., its realizations x̂ =
{̂x(t)}∞t=1 ∈ D are distributed independently across stages. Therefore, the shifted
realization x̂+ follows the same stochastic distribution as x̂ , viz. ξSSE. Moreover,
the shifted realizations x̂+ are distributed independently from the first-period choice
x̂(1) prescribed by the realized pure strategy x̂ . Hence, noting that x̂(1) follows the
distribution (5), we arrive at (x) = 14 · (x+), as claimed.
Case 2 Next, suppose that the first-period choice prescribed by the pure strategy x is
x(1) = (0, 0, 1). This case is similar to the previous one insofar that strategy x loses
the possibility of winning all three objects unless ω(1) realizes to ω0. But, in contrast
to the previous case, if indeed ω(1) = ω0, then strategy x has already won object C
at stage t = 1, so that the allocation remains undetermined only for objects A and B.
Hence, in this case, x weakly wins all three objects against a specific pure-strategy
realization x̂ ∈ D from the distribution ξSSE if and only if the following two conditions
hold: (i) the first-stage choice prescribed by x̂ satisfies x̂(1) = (0, 0, 0), and (ii) the
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shifted realization x̂+ satisfies x̂+ ≤ (x+A , x+B , 1). Exploiting again the stationarity of
ξSSE, it follows that
(x) = 1
4
· (x+A , x+B , 1) =
ρ(x+A )ρ(x
+
B )
4
. (15)
Case 3 Suppose now that x(1) = (0, 1, 1). Then, following the same reasoning as
above, it can be checked that strategy x weakly wins all the objects against a specific
realization x̂ ∈ D of the behavior strategy ξSSE if either (i) ω(1) = ω0 and x̂+ ≤
(x+A , 1, 1), or (ii) ω(1) = ω1 and x̂+ ≤ x+. Hence,
(x) = 1
4
· ρ(x+A ) +
1
4
· (x+), (16)
as claimed.
Case 4 Finally, suppose that x(1) = (1, 1, 1). In this case, it is obvious that strategy
x weakly wins all the objects against a specific realization x̂ ∈ D of the behavior
strategy ξSSE if ω(1) = ω0. But strategy x likewise weakly wins all the objects if
either (i) ω(1) = ω1 and x̂+ ≤ (1, x+B , x+C ), or (ii) ω(1) = ω2 and x̂+ ≤ (x+A , 1, x+C ),
or (iii) ω(1) = ω3 and x̂+ ≤ (x+A , x+B , 1). The assertion follows now as before.
Since all cases have been covered, this proves relationship (13). unionsq
Next, returning to the proof of Lemma 1, it will be checked that there are no profitable
deviations. As noted in the previous section, the expected payoff of ξSSE against itself
is zero. Hence, a profitable deviation must yield a strictly positive expected payoff. One
can check that the dynamic chopstick auction is not continuous at infinity (Fudenberg
and Tirole 1991, p. 110), so that the one-stage deviation principle cannot be invoked.
Fortunately, however, the arguments remain manageable because of the stationarity
of ξSSE. The following cases need to be considered.
Case A Suppose first that a pure strategy x ∈ D exists such that
x(1) ∈ S∗1 ≡ {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)}, (17)
and such that (x) > 0. Thus, intuitively, there is a profitable deviation that does not
start right away, but only at a later stage. Then, in any of these cases, a straightforward
calculation using Lemma 2 as well as Eqs. (9) and (12) delivers (x) = 14 · (x+).
For example, if x(1) = (0, 1, 1), then
(x) = ρ(x
+
A )(1 + ρ(x+B ))
2
+ ρ(x
+
A )(1 + ρ(x+C ))
2
+ (1 + ρ(x
+
B ))(1 + ρ(x+C ))
2
− ρ(x
+
A )
2
4
− (1 + ρ(x
+
B ))
2
4
− (1 + ρ(x
+
C ))
2
4
− ρ(x+A ) − (x+). (18)
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Collecting terms, we find that, indeed,
(x) = ρ(x
+
A )ρ(x
+
B )
2
+ ρ(x
+
A )ρ(x
+
C )
2
+ ρ(x
+
B )ρ(x
+
C )
2
− ρ(x
+
A )
2
4
− ρ(x
+
B )
2
4
− ρ(x
+
C )
2
4
− (x+) (19)
= 1
4
· (x+). (20)
The other cases are similar. Thus, even though there is no discounting, delaying a
profitable deviation would only lower expected payoffs. Conversely, this shows that
the deviation x+ ∈ D, if used from stage t = 1 onwards, would magnify the strictly
positive expected payoff from strategy x by the factor 4. Iterating this argument, if nec-
essary, and using the fact that expected payoffs in the chopstick auction are bounded,
we find after finitely many applications of the shift operator that there necessarily
exists also a profitable pure-strategy deviation x̂ ∈ D that does not satisfy (17). Thus,
it suffices to consider the remaining cases.
Case B Suppose next that
x(1) ∈ {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}. (21)
By renaming the objects, if necessary, one may assume without loss of generality that
x(1) = (0, 0, 1). But then, using Eqs. (9) and (12), as well as Lemma 2, one obtains
(x) = ρ(x
+
A )ρ(x
+
B )
2
+ ρ(x
+
A )(1 + ρ(x+C ))
2
+ ρ(x
+
B )(1 + ρ(x+C ))
2
− ρ(x
+
A )
2
4
− ρ(x
+
B )
2
4
−
(
1 + ρ(x+C )
)2
4
− ρ(x+A )ρ(x+B ) (22)
= (−1
4
) · (ρ(x+A ) + ρ(x+B ) − ρ(x+C ) − 1)2 (23)
≤ 0. (24)
Thus, there is no profitable deviation x satisfying (21).12
Case C Finally, consider the case where
x(1) = (1, 1, 1). (25)
12 However, here and below, there are obvious indifference relationships, which will matter in the deter-
mination of the best-response set. See Sect. 5.
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In this case, one again makes use of Eqs. (9) and (12) as well as of Lemma 2, and finds
(x) = (1 + ρ(x
+
A ))(1 + ρ(x+B ))
2
+ (1 + ρ(x
+
A ))(1 + ρ(x+C ))
2
+ (1 + ρ(x
+
B ))(1 + ρ(x+C ))
2
− (1 + ρ(x
+
A ))
2
4
− (1 + ρ(x
+
B ))
2
4
− (1 + ρ(x
+
C ))
2
4
− 1 − ρ(x+A )ρ(x+B ) − ρ(x+A )ρ(x+C ) − ρ(x+B )ρ(x+C ). (26)
Rearranging yields
(x) =
(
−1
4
)
· (ρ (x+A
) + ρ (x+B
) + ρ (x+C
) − 1)2 ≤ 0. (27)
Hence, it is weakly suboptimal to use a pure strategy x ∈ D satisfying (25) against
ξSSE.
Since there is no profitable pure-strategy deviation, the behavior strategy ξSSE defines
a symmetric equilibrium in the dynamic chopstick auction. This completes the proof
of Lemma 1. unionsq
5 Analysis of the best-response set
This section discusses issues related to the dimensionality of the SSE. More precisely,
we will follow Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a) in comparing the respective dimensions
of the equilibrium support and the best-response set. For the SRE, the equilibrium sup-
port has dimension 2, which is strictly smaller than the dimension of the corresponding
best-response set, which is 3. To deal with the SSE, obviously, the traditional defi-
nition of dimensionality in terms of degrees of freedom, which is very suitable for
smooth objects such as simplices and manifolds, needs to be extended. Below, we
shall therefore make use of a more general notion of dimensionality.
We first recall the notion of the Hausdorff dimension.13 Given a bounded subset
S ⊆ RL , with L ≥ 1, and some nonnegative real number d ≥ 0, the d-dimensional
Hausdorff content of S is defined as the infimum of the set of numbers δ ≥ 0 such
that there exist sequences {zn}∞n=1 in RL and {rn}∞n=1 in R++ such that (i) for any
z ∈ S, there is some index n such that |z − zn| ≤ rn , and (ii) ∑∞n=1 rdn < δ. The
Hausdorff dimension of S, denoted by dimH (S), is the infimum of all d for which the
d-dimensional Hausdorff content of S is zero.
13 According to Falconer (2014), the Hausdorff dimension is the oldest and probably most important notion
of fractal dimension. This notion is also consistent with the dimensionality notion used by Kvasov (2007,
caption of Figure 2).
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Fig. 1 Construction of the
Sierpinski tetrahedron
Let S∗ denote the support of the equilibrium bid distribution μSSE. One can convince
oneself that the set S∗ consists precisely of those bid vectors X = (X A, X B, XC ) ∈ R3+
that are contained in the component-wise image of the support of ξ˜SSE under the
mapping ρ.14 Thus, the set S∗ is the popular self-similar structure known as the
Sierpinski tetrahedron. Rather than offering a formal description, we will provide a
geometric description of S∗. The Sierpinski tetrahedron may be constructed from its
solid counterpart by first carving out a regular octahedron (see Fig. 1), then repeating
that task on each of the resulting four smaller tetrahedra, and finally iterating this step
at infinitum.
The set S∗ is compact and of the same cardinality as the unit cube [0, 1]3, but its
Lebesgue measure is zero, and it is not dense in any non-degenerate interval. The
Hausdorff dimension of the Sierpinski tetrahedron S∗ is
dimH (S∗) = ln 4ln 2 = 2, (28)
as follows from standard results on the dimensionality of self-similar sets (see, e.g.,
Falconer 2014, Theorem 9.3; cf. also Kvasov 2007). Since the Sierpinski tetrahedron
contains its four outer vertices, the convex hull of S∗ is just the solid tetrahedron-shaped
best-response set considered by Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a).
We can show now the following:
Proposition 2 In the simultaneous chopstick auction, the set of pure best responses
to μSSE has Hausdorff dimension two.
14 Indeed, the support of ξ˜SSE is compact by Tychonoff’s theorem and, hence, its continuous image
S∗∗ ⊆ [0, 1]3 under the component-wise application of the mapping ρ is likewise compact. It follows that
S∗∗ is closed and of SSE measure one, so that S∗ ⊆ S∗∗. Conversely, the pre-image of any non-empty set
relative open in S∗∗ is non-empty and relative open in the support of ξ˜SSE, and consequently has positive
measure under ξ˜SSE. Hence, S∗ ⊇ S∗∗, which implies S∗ = S∗∗.
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Proof As seen in Sect. 4, a pure best response x ∈ D to ξSSE in the dynamic chopstick
auction is either a pure strategy in the support of ξSSE, or a finite sequence in the set
S∗1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)}, (29)
followed by a pure strategy x̂ ∈ D such that either, up to a renaming of objects,
x̂(1) = (0, 0, 1) and
ρ(̂x+A ) + ρ(̂x+B ) − ρ(̂x+C ) − 1 = 0, (30)
or x̂(1) = (1, 1, 1) and
ρ(̂x+A ) + ρ(̂x+B ) + ρ(̂x+C ) − 1 = 0. (31)
In the former case, relationship (12) implies
ρ(̂xA) = ρ(̂x
+
A )
2
, ρ(̂xB) = ρ(̂x
+
B )
2
, and ρ(̂xC ) = 1 + ρ(̂x
+
C )
2
, (32)
so that Eq. (30) becomes equivalent to
ρ(̂xA) + ρ(̂xB) = ρ(̂xC ), (33)
where
ρ(̂xA) ≤ 12 , ρ(̂xB) ≤
1
2
, and ρ(̂xC ) ≥ 12 .
In the latter case,
ρ(̂xA) = 1 + ρ(̂x
+
A )
2
, ρ(̂xB) = 1 + ρ(̂x
+
B )
2
, and ρ(̂xC ) = 1 + ρ(̂x
+
C )
2
, (34)
so that Eq. (31) is equivalent to
ρ(̂xA) + ρ(̂xB) + ρ(̂xC ) = 2, (35)
where
ρ(̂xA) ≥ 12 , ρ(̂xB) ≥
1
2
, and ρ(̂xC ) ≥ 12 . (36)
Moreover, the best-response set in the simultaneous chopstick auction is the image
under the component-wise application of the mapping ρ of the best-response set in
the dynamic auction. Thus, invoking some geometric intuition, the best-response set
of the SSE may be thought of as adding to the equilibrium support the four faces of
each of the tetrahedra considered during the iterative construction of the Sierpinski
tetrahedron. The set of best responses to μSSE is, therefore, the denumerable union of
two-dimensional sets, and as such, two-dimensional. unionsq
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Thus, in contrast to the SRE, the best-response set of the SSE is indeed of the same
dimension as its equilibrium support. Still, it is hard to tell in the abstract if this property
makes it more likely that a process favoring better or best responses would lead to the
SSE rather than to the SRE.15
6 Relationship to the literature on “fractal” solutions
In this section, it will be shown that the SSE may be characterized as a measure
invariant under a simple replacement operation. This way, we can also explain how
the SSE relates to “fractal” solutions considered in prior work on the Blotto game.
Consider the following four contraction mappings on the unit cube [0, 1]3:
C0(X) = 12 X (37)
C1(X) = 12 {X + (0, 1, 1)} (38)
C2(X) = 12 {X + (1, 0, 1)} (39)
C3(X) = 12 {X + (1, 1, 0)} (40)
Then, by construction, μSSE is an invariant measure (Hutchinson 1981) with respect to
the above family of contractions {Ck}4k=1. In other words, the probability distribution
μSSE is identical to the equally-weighted convex combination of the four image mea-
sures of μSSE with respect to the contractions (37)–(40). This property can actually
be used to characterize the SSE.
Proposition 3 The probability distribution μSSE is characterized by the property that
it is invariant with respect to the family of contractions {Ck}4k=1.
Proof The claim follows immediately from the fact that the invariant measure is unique
(Hutchinson 1981, Sec. 4). unionsq
The relationship to existing work on “fractal” solutions will be discussed now. Gross
and Wagner (1950) constructed new classes of equilibria of Colonel Blotto games by
replacing a given hexagon in the hexagonal solution by a convex combination of six
smaller replicas. Iterating this replacement operation a finite number of times, abso-
lutely continuous bid distributions of arbitrary geometric complexity (the so-called
snowflake solutions) have be constructed. The main purpose of such constructions,
however, was it to show that solutions exist with a support of Lebesgue measure smaller
than any given ε > 0. It was also noted that the respective smallest building blocks
15 However, the robustness of the SSE is supported by ongoing research on the numerical computation of
the equilibrium.
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in this construction, obtained after a finite number of operations, may be replaced by
suitably demagnified disk solutions.16
More recently, the same approach of iteratively deriving new equilibria from exist-
ing ones has been used by Kvasov (2007) to construct “fractal” solutions to Colonel
Blotto games with costly resources. Thereby, it has been shown that, also in this case,
there are solutions with the property that the support of the symmetric equilibrium
strategy has an arbitrarily small but positive Lebesgue measure. The family of con-
tractions (37)–(40) considered above for the chopstick auction is obviously a variant
of the Gross–Wagner–Kvasov replacement operation for Blotto games.
However, it remains an open question whether a finite iteration of applying the
replacement operation (37)–(40) to the SRE would similarly lead to new classes of
equilibria in the chopstick auction. Indeed, while the equilibrium property in a Blotto
game may be verified quite easily by checking that univariate marginals are uniform
(Roberson 2006), no such simple test is available in the case of the chopstick auction.
Instead, geometric considerations of substantial complexity would be needed.17 In
particular, the results of the present paper do not easily follow from existing work.18
7 Conclusion
A new type of equilibrium has been identified for an important prototype model of the
simultaneous auction, the so-called chopstick auction. A somewhat unusual aspect
of the equilibrium bid distribution is that it may be characterized as a self-similar
probability measure. Even though similar “fractal” solutions have been constructed
before in the class of Blotto games and in games with rational payoff functions, this
possibility was (to the author’s knowledge) not a well-known feature of the class of
simultaneous auctions. The observation must, therefore, be added, to the collection of
perplexing properties of this interesting class of auctions.
It is tempting to consider any “fractal” solution as irrelevant on the grounds that
it is too complicated. The analysis above has shown that this conclusion might be
unwarranted. After all, using the dynamic transcription of the simultaneous auction, the
self-similar equilibrium constructed in the body of the present paper may be described
in simple and intuitive terms. Moreover, there is some evidence (work in progress) that
the theoretical robustness property established in the present paper actually matters
for numerical computations of the equilibrium strategy, which is also consistent with
the prediction of Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b). Thus, the self-similar equilibrium
16 In fact, it is not hard to convince oneself that any equilibrium of the Blotto game, including those recently
identified by Weinstein (2012), may be used as smallest-scale replacements in this sort of construction.
17 Even using the methods developed in the present paper, the question will not be easy to answer. The
reason is that, if the SRE is translated back into a behavior strategy in the dynamic auction using Kuhn’s
construction, it turns out to be not only non-stationary, but also path-dependent. This makes it quite difficult
to decide the Nash property for candidate equilibria that are derived from the SRE through finite iterations
of the replacement operation.
18 Conversely, however, it is possible to construct entirely new equilibria in Blotto games using the methods
developed in the present paper. See the Conclusion.
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may, paradoxically perhaps, be thought of as being both simpler and more robust than
the known solution.
There are large classes of games in political economy, including in particular the
interesting class of majority auctions, that may be seen as direct generalizations of
the two-bidder three-object auction and for which, in some important special cases,
essentially nothing is known about the equilibrium set (cf. Szentes and Rosenthal
2003b). Unfortunately, a direct extension of the methods developed in the present paper
is not fruitful. For example, in a majority auction with five objects, raising the bids
dynamically on a randomly selected subset of, say, three objects does not constitute
an equilibrium. Therefore, more refined methods are necessary to construct equilibria
in those games. A more or less obvious case in which the methods developed in the
present paper can actually be used to construct new and interesting equilibria is the
class of continuous Colonel Blotto and Colonel Lotto games.19 However, elaborating
further on this extension would go beyond the scope of the present paper. We hope to
be able to document these findings more explicitly in future research.
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